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CRIMINAL LAW: ADMISSIBILITY OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED
EVIDENCE - IMPEACHMENT OF ACCUSED AS A WITNESS
Harrisv. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)
Petitioner, on trial for the unlawful sale of narcotics, took the stand in
his own defense. During his testimony, he admitted selling a glassine bag
to an undercover officer but claimed the bag contained only baking powder,
and that the sale was part of a scheme to defraud the purchaser. On crossexamination petitioner was asked whether he had made certain statements
to the police immediately following his arrest, which partially contradicted
his direct testimony at trial.' The pretrial statements were obtained from
petitioner before he was informed of his right to counsel and were therefore
inadmissible into evidence during the prosecution's direct case against the
defendant2 Over defendant's objection, the evidence was admitted for impeachment purposes, the defendant was convicted, and the decision affirmed
by the Court of Appeals of New York.3 On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed and HELD, statements inadmissible against a defendant, because of
lack of procedural safeguards required by Miranda v. Arizona 4 may, if their
trustworthiness satisfies legal stand-ards, be used for impeachment purposes
to attack the credibility of a defendant's trial testimony. 5
At common law, evidence was not rendered inadmissable if obtained by
illegal means. Exclusionary rules of evidence were introduced in both federalJ7 and state courts8 to prohibit the use of illegally secured evidence. In
Weeks v. United States9 the Supreme Court ruled that evidence obtained
during an illegal search violated the fourth amendment and was therefore
inadmissible in federal courts.-0 The scope of the Weeks doctrine was subsequently enlarged to prohibit indirect use of evidence obtained in violation
of the fourth amendment.' An exception to the Weeks exclusionary rule
was created in Walder v. United States,'2 which permitted the introduction
1. See People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. 2d 828, 829, 298 N.Y.S.2d 245, 247

(2d Dep't

1969), noting that the defendant admitted he had bought the narcotics outside a bar and
subsequently sold the narcotics inside the bar to the undercover police officer.
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), requires that an individual taken into
custody be advised of his right to counsel before interrogation.
3. Harris v. New York, 25 N.Y.2d 175, 250 N.E.2d 349 (1970).
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
6. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927).
7. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
8. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
9. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
10. Id. at 393. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the exclusionary rule was made
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
11. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920), where
the Court said "the essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but
that it should not be used at all."
12. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
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of evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure for the limited
purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility as a witness when he took
the stand in his own defense.3 In Walder, on direct examination the defendant
made sweeping claims that he had never possessed narcotics, 4 but the prosecution was allowed to introduce evidence 'that the defendant had been earlier indicted for possession of narcotics.5 Because the drugs sought to be
admitted in the original case were illegally seized, they were inadmissible
against the defendant for possession of narcotics, but testimony regarding
those narcotics was admissible in Walder for the sole purpose of impeaching
defendant's testimony.16 The Court felt that ascertaining the truth and getting the complete story before a jury justified the limitation upon the Weeks
17
rule.
A second exclusionary rule introduced in Miranda v. Arizona's proscribes
the use of evidence obtained through interrogation of a suspect prior to advising him of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. 9 The
Walder court, by comparison, was concerned not with evidence obtained
through interrogation but only with the admissibility of evidence that was
the product of an illegal search and seizure.20 The Walder court did not indicate whether evidence obtained by illegal interrogation, and therefore
inadmissible in the prosecution's direct case, may be used to impeach the
witness; 21 however, Walder did indicate that the defendant must be free to
deny all the "elements of the case" against him without giving the govern22
ment the evidence illegally secured.
Cases subsequent to Walder have equated "elements of the case" with
"elements of the crime," and allowed impeachment of defendant's testimony
unless the testimony related to matters within, the narrow definition of
"elements of the crime."23 Whereas in Walder the defendant was impeached
after denying an event unconnected with his present 'trial, 24 defendants in
subsequent cases were impeached after denying events directly connected
with the crimes of which they were charged. 25 Thus, although the Walder
13. Compare Walder v. United States, 47 U.S. 62 (1954), with Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20 (1925), where illegally obtained evidence was not allowed for impeachment

purposes.
14. 347 U.S. at 65.
15. Id. at 64.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 65. See also Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958), holding that
"the interests of the other party and regard for the function of courts of justice to ascertain the truth become relevant and prevails in balandng of considerations .

18. 884 uS. 46 (1966).
19. Id. at 444, 445.
20. 347 U.S. at 65.
21. See Note, The Collateral Use Doctrine: From Walder to Miraida, 62 Nw. U.L. REv.

912 (1968).
22. 347 U.S. at 65.
23. E.g., United States v. Currey, 858 F.2d 904, 911 (2d Cir. 1966).
24. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
25. E.g., Bailey v. United States, 328 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Tate v. United States,
283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Lockley v. United States, 270 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1959),
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court implied that the defendant should be able to deny all elements of the
direct case against him, its holding has been narrowly interpreted and impeachment of a defendant-witness has been allowed as to matters involving
the direct case against him.
As a general rule, if an accused takes -the stand in his own behalf he
subjects himself to the same liabilities on cross-examination as do other witnesses, and he becomes subject to attacks on his credibility. 26 The instant
decision permits further attack on his credibility by allowing admissions inadmissible in the direct prosecution to be used for impeachment; thus, the
defendant takes the stand in his own behalf at the risk of an otherwise inadmissible confession being used for impeachment. In effect, this penalizes
a defendant for exercising a constitutional right because he is denied an
"unfettered" choice in deciding whether to take the stand in his own defense. 27 Further, the defendant's dilemma of whether to take -the stand is
made even more critical by the fact that confessions -are recognized as the
most compelling possible evidence of guilt to a jury. 28 As a practical matter,
if the defendant fails to take the stand, the jury may construe this as an
indication of his guilt, 29 whereas if he does take the stand, the prosecution
may introduce the illegally obtained confession to impeach his testimony3 0
This dilemma seemed to have been resolved in Miranda when the Court indicated that the privilege against self-incrimination protects an individual
from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner 3 and further
that evidence illegally obtained could not be used against him by the state
in any manner. 32 The effect of the instant decision, however, is to present
again the dilemma of whether the defendant should take the stand in his
own behalf. If he does, any statements made prior to his receiving the Miranda warnings will be admissible for impeachment purposes, and consequently
will become, either consciously or unconsciously, factors considered by the
jury in determining guilt or innocence. Should the defendant decline to
take the stand in his own behalf, however, this would likely raise a presump33
tion of guilt in the minds of the jurors.
Two policy considerations recognized in both Miranda and Weeks are
the deterrence of illegal police conduct 34 and the exclusion of unreliable
26. E.g., Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 499 (1926). See also 3 J. WIGMORF, EVIDENCE
§890 (3d ed. 1940).
27. Cf. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), holding that the choice of whether
to testify in one's own defense must be unfettered since that choice is an exercise of a
constitutional privilege.
28. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
29. Cf. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940-41 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
30. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933).
31. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966), where the court said: "[S]tatements
merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial . .. . These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the
word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any
other statement." (dictum) (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 476.
33. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940-41 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
34. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1966); Weeks v. United States, 232 US. 383,
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evidence s5 Although both policy considerations were present in Miranda
and Weeks, the effect of applying the Walder doctrine to each case would
give opposite results. For example, to deter illegal police conduct any incentive for the police to engage in illegal conduct must be removed. 38 If
illegally obtained evidence could not be used for any purpose in a trial
related to that offense then the police would have little incentive to obtain
the information for a subsequent trial for impeachment purposes.37 If the
impeaching evidence is related to the offense for which the defendant is
charged, however, then Walder and its progeny3 s act to thwart the policy
of deterring illegal police conduct by providing the police an incentive to
use illegal methods to acquire evidence against the defendant.3 9
Regarding the policy of excluding unreliable evidence, the application
of the Walder doctrine to Weeks may be justified by the nature of evidence
obtained through illegal searches and seizures. Evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is generally physical evidence, and its reliability for impeachment purposes is usually not questioned.40 However, with
respect -to confessions, the Supreme Court has recognized that coercion,
whether physical or mental, can induce an individual to say almost anything
his interrogators wish him to say. 41 Applying the Walder doctrine to admitting otherwise inadmissible evidence for impeachment purposes to confeisions otherwise inadmissible under Miranda would seem to defeat the policy
considerations of both Miranda and Weeks by providing police with incentive to secure illegal confessions 42 and thereby make unreliable evidence
reliable.43
In the instant case the Court was forced to balance the competing policies
underlying the Miranda exclusionary rule and the Walder exception to the
Weeks exclusionary rule. The Court narrowly held that the Walder doctrine
applied to confessions that were otherwise inadmissible in chief because of
Miranda.- The Court felt that sufficient deterrence of illegal police conduct
would flow when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prose591 (1914).
35. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966), the Court stated that the presence
of counsel at the interrogation "can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness" and elim-

inate the compulsion inherent in police investigation; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
394 (1914).
36. See, e.g., State v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 422 P.2d 581 (1967).
37. See generally Walder v. United States, 547 U.S. 62 (1954).
38. E.g., Bailey v. United States, 328 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Tate v. United States,

283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Lockley v. United States, 270 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1959). See
text accompanying note 25 supra.
39. Two incentives remain to encourage the police to engage in illegal conduct - to
discredit the accused if he chooses to take the stand in his own defense and concommitantly to discourage the defendant from taking the stand for fear of his being discredited.
40. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 638 (1965).
41. Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 551 (1952). See also Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 478 (1960),

42. See text accompanying note 37 sura.
43. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1966). $ge aso 384 U.S. at 470.
44. 401 U.S. at 224-26.
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